Lately, however, the energy partnership between the EU and Turkey seems to have petered out – as a result of different strategic priorities and a rebalancing of bilateral relations – risking jeopardizing the energy security of both Brussels and Ankara.
The key role of Turkey
“Contributing to European energy security‘ is one of the four main priority actions defined by the Ankara government in its national energy strategy. Thanks to its position as a bridge between European markets and reserves located in the Middle East and in the Caspian Sea, Turkey actually plays a key role in the European policy of energy procurement diversification. After the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline – which will transport Azeri oil in the Mediterranean by-passing travelling over Russian soil and through the Bosphorus – Turkey is the key element of the Southern Gas Corridor, an initiative launched by Brussels in an attempt to relieve European dependency of Russian gas supplies.
The extraordinary economic growth and exponential increase in domestic energy consumption, however, have gradually changed Ankara’s position in the regional energy scenario. From a simple transit country for flows of gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe, Turkey currently aspires to become a true energy hub, which would guarantee the country better trading conditions and greater procurement security to deal with the continued expansion of demand for gas.
New Turkish requirements risk placing Ankara and Brussels in different positions, and competing increasingly over access to new energy resources. This eventuality is made even more likely by the developments of the crisis in Ukraine and by the possible suspension of supplies by Moscow, on which Ankara - like the EU - depends for a good part of its consumption. In this context, the deadlock in negotiations for joining the EU definitely makes energy cooperation with Brussels conditional on the urgent Turkish national priorities.
Difficult negotiations on Chapter 15
In previous years, the (presumed or actual) connection between cooperation in the sphere of energy and progress in the process of joining the Union has fueled great expectations on the part of the Turkish government. However, the timid approach of the Commission to the dossier turned into total hostility from (some) Member States, which are actually preventing the start of negotiations on Chapter 15 regarding energy and, through this, any type of progress relating to joining.
In an attempt to overcome these obstacles without compromising cooperation regarding energy, Brussels has launched two major institutional initiatives. The first is negotiations for Turkey to join the Energy Community, an organization created in 2006 to promote the adoption of the energy Community acquis in European countries which are not members of the Union, in order to extend the creation of a single energy and gas market. The second is the launch of the Positive Agenda, a package of proposals launched by the Commission with the aim of resuming negotiations between Turkey and the EU revolving around the vetoes of Member States (first and foremost Cyprus) on the opening of Chapter 15. Both initiatives, however, have essentially come to a standstill as a result of the resistance of the Turkish authorities, skeptical of European moves considered practical for European interests without offering certainty in exchange on the outcome of the membership process.
The most surprising consequence of this cooling down is definitely the agreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan for the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). The new pipeline – which marked the end of the European Nabucco project – actually weakens the position of the EU with regard to Azerbaijan, which will have total control over the transportation of gas as far as the south-east borders of the Union. For its part, Ankara, thanks to alignment with the interests of Baku, has obtained significant discounts on the price of the gas extracted from the Shah Deniz II offshore field in the Caspian Sea.
Although the stalemate in the membership process has led Turkey and the EU to conflicting positions in the development of the Southern Corridor, Ankara and Brussels are not short of opportunities for starting bilateral talks again. The liberalization of the Turkish energy market and its progressive integration with the European one are a compulsory step for achieving Ankara’s goal of transforming the country into an energy hub and crossroads between Russia, the Caspian Sea, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe. Added to this is the need for Turkey to attract investment and promote technology in the sectors of renewable energy and energy efficiency, in which a partnership with the EU represents added value to deal with the exceptional growth in Turkish consumption in coming years.
Another open chapter is that of the development of resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey plays a vital role in its future. The most promising fields are actually located in the territorial waters of Israel and Cyprus, whose relations with the Turkish government have deteriorated and risk hindering the extraction of resources (specifically those of Cyprus), and above all preventing new supplies from reaching European markets. However, it is precisely Turkey’s need to extend and diversify its own energy portfolio thanks to Eastern Mediterranean gas that could push Ankara toward closer cooperation with Brussels, in an attempt to overcome (or at least get around) the wall of the Cypriot conflict and convince Israel to choose Turkey to sell the gas extracted from the Leviathan field and transport it to Europe.
