By Annemarie Botzki
Posted 29 May 2014 08:15 GMT
Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras met European Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger on Wednesday to discuss Greece’s role in European energy security.
The two discussed Greece’s offshore hydrocarbon reserves and its LNG terminal, according to Oettinger, as well as progress in the privatisation of Greece’s gas transmission network operator, DESFA. State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic bought a 66% stake in DESFA in 2013.
Oettinger said Greece’s role in the European gas market is of growing importance. “We also discussed a potential pipeline system offshore Greece – linking hydrocarbon reserves to the market,” he added.
An offshore pipeline connecting the Greek and Italian gas transportation systems – the IGI-Poseidon pipeline, led by Italian utility Edison and Greek public gas supply company DEPA – is included on the EU-wide list of Projects of Common Interest.
“Such a pipeline project, as well as an LNG alternative, would make a larger contribution to European energy security, especially if combined with prospective Greek hydrocarbons production,” a study by Greece’s Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, titled Greece in Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy, found.
The European commission is aiming to diversify its supplies in light of the Ukraine crisis and has continually stressed the importance of LNG imports.
“The Greek LNG terminal is of growing importance in this regard,” Oettinger told journalists in Brussels on Wednesday.
The Revithoussa terminal, located west of Athens, is operated by DESFA, which is a subsidiary of DEPA.
Greece receives most of its LNG from Algeria on long-term contracts, with some additional volumes from the spot market, according to International Energy Agency data. Following an expansion of the terminal in 2007, further upgrades to increase gas receiving, storage and send-out capacity are planned.
The project will involve the construction of a third storage tank and will cost up to €166 million ($226 million), according to the European Investment Bank. The bank has proposed to finance €80 million of this.
SOURCE
Thursday, May 29, 2014
Wednesday, May 28, 2014
Αναμένοντας το Saipem 10000 | InBusiness
Αναμένοντας το Saipem 10000
Στο drillship της ΕΝΙ οι ελπίδες για τερματικό εντός χρονοδιαγραμμάτων
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Σε αντίθεση με τις έρευνες που διεξήγαγε η Noble στο Οικόπεδο 12 κατά τις οποίες χρησιμοποίησε πλατφόρμα, η ΕΝΙ εκτός απροόπτου θα χρησιμοποιήσει ειδικό πλοίο που κάνει τη συγκεκριμένη εργασία (drillship). Πρόκειται για το Saipem 10000 το οποίο ανήκει στην Saipem, θυγατρική της ΕΝΙ. Το 228 μέτρων πλοίο βρίσκεται αυτήν την περίοδο στη Μοζαμβίκη και εκτός απροόπτου αναμένεται στην Κύπρο περί τα τέλη Αυγούστου. Το πλοίο που μπορεί να τρυπήσει σε βάθος μέχρι 10.000 πόδια από την επιφάνεια της θάλασσας φτάνοντας μέχρι και 30.000 πόδια στο υπόστρωμα, θα κάνει το πρώτο βήμα για να διαφανεί κατά πόσο υπάρχουν στην κυπριακή ΑΟΖ κι άλλα κοιτάσματα τα οποία μπορούν να τύχουν εκμετάλλευσης σε σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα ώστε η λειτουργία του τερματικού υγροποίησης να είναι βιώσιμη αλλά και επικερδής.
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Ο πρώην διευθυντής της υπηρεσίας Ενέργειας του υπουργείου Εμπορίου Σόλωνας Κασίνης σχολίασε στο InBusinessNews πως η δημιουργία τερματικού είναι η μόνη λύση για την Κύπρο και όσο πιο γρήγορα καταλήξει η κυβέρνηση σε τελεσίδικη απόφαση τόσο το καλύτερο. «Υπάρχουν επαρκείς ποσότητες στην κυπριακή ΑΟΖ για να καλύψουν τη λειτουργία του τερματικού», σχολίασε.
Στη ξηρά και συγκεκριμένα στο λιμάνι Λάρνακας, οι υποστηρικτικές διαδικασίες για τις ενέργειες της ΕΝΙ τρέχουν με γοργούς ρυθμούς. Η κοινοπραξία Medserv-Καραμοντάνης ετοιμάζει τις απαραίτητες εγκαταστάσεις. Παράλληλα η εταιρεία Halliburton που θα δημιουργήσει τη λεγόμενη «λάσπη» που θα χρησιμοποιηθεί στη γεώτρηση, έχει υπογράψει συμφωνία με την ΕΝΙ και αναμένεται να στήσει τη μονάδα παραγωγής εντός του χώρου που δόθηκε στη Medserv.
Link to source: http://www.sigmalive.com/inbusiness/news/business/energy/%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%BC%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%82-%CF%84%CE%BF-saipem-10000
Mediterranean gas not yet the answer for Turkey's ties with Israel, Cyprus | Al Monitor
US Vice President Joe Biden, on his recent
visit to Cyprus, showed the importance the White House is placing on
finding alternate energy routes into Europe for the newly discovered
deposits of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean in an
attempt to loosen Europe’s dependence on Russia.
Biden’s May 21 arrival on Cyprus marked the most senior US official visit to the island in more than five decades.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called Biden’s meeting with Turkish Cypriot President Dervis Eroglu a “historic step,” providing ample encouragement for a fair and just settlement of the Cyprus issue. “Biden’s message, which demonstrates an equidistant approach to the parties, is positive, according to us,” Davutoglu said May 23.
To what extent will the discovery of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean play a role in progress on the Cyprus problem, or on efforts toward a Turkish-Israeli reconciliation? After all, Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar offshore natural gas fields are greater in amount and depth than Cyprus’ Aphrodite and Block 12 reserves.
The underlying assumption is twofold: that Turkey will, for the foreseeable future, have a ferocious demand for gas to feed its economy, and that Turkey envisions itself as an energy transit hub between Central Asia, the southern Caucasus and Europe. In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean gas is very attractive to Turkey, regardless of its amount and regardless of whether it could really provide an opportunity to free Turkey from dependence on Russian and Iranian imports.
Michael Leigh, of the German Marshall Fund and a former EU Commission director-general for enlargement, told Al-Monitor, “This assumption can be challenged on economic grounds before you come to any political issues which are at stake.” Leigh wondered whether Turkey would position its policy on these highly political questions regarding the hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus and Israel.
Leigh began his argument questioning Turkey’s future demand for gas. “This very much depends on the growth rate of the Turkish economy. Certainly, if you project the kind of growth rates that Turkey has enjoyed over the last decade, you might conclude that Turkey needs to add to its energy supply from any sources whatsoever,” he said. “However, growth has now slowed down tremendously in Turkey. It is very hard for us to project forward and to know what that demand will be in the future.”
Turkey has a number of other sources of gas that are far greater in scale than what might ever be available in the Eastern Mediterranean, said Leigh, with Russia at the top of the list. “Of course, Turkey has an interest in the European Union diversifying away from Russia to some degree,” he said. “But there is no way the Eastern Mediterranean (gas) could make a significant dent in the 60% of gas Turkey is currently buying from Russia. Also, Turkey can look to Azerbaijan and to Iran as important sources of gas.”
Leigh also puts a big question mark over the price issue. “It is still too early to say what price either Israel or Cyprus will be ready to sell gas to Turkey. But costs in Eastern Mediterranean are rather high,” he said. “And it is very far from certain that Turkey will be ready to pay the price that the companies in the Eastern Mediterranean would need to get a decent return on their investment. There is all that by way of uncertainty.”
A prominent source in the Turkish Energy Ministry said Turkey is not concerned a bit about any of the above. “There are not enough deposits of hydrocarbons in the Aphrodite gas field or Block 12, but the Greek Cypriots remain hopeful for coming up with new discoveries. Speaking for now, though, it is not feasible for any investor to spend the money on infrastructure to bring the hydrocarbons to the surface,” the official told Al-Monitor.
“To us, it is their problem whether they find additional reserves or whether they want to export these hydrocarbons at any given time. If they do want to export them, however, it is clear that Turkey is the best route and therefore they will realize that it is also in their best interest to find a justly negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue.” He added, “When their politics come to this realization, we will be happy to sit down and talk about it in detail.”
So far, the scale of discoveries in Cyprus has been considerately below expectations, making an investment for a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant out of question. Leigh said that Noble energy, TOTAL and ENI are drilling to find new gas deposits, and stressed that building floating LNG plants is a costly investment. “For an LNG plant to be commercially viable it needs two trains (liquefaction facilities). … One train LNG plant costs $6 billion. Two trains cost $9 billion and three trains cost $12 billion,” Leigh said. “And to get a good economic return, you really need these two (trains). So, the court is out as to whether Cyprus is going to find sufficient quantities in order for the export options to be viable. The other main idea as to how Cyprus could have enough quantity to justify export infrastructure is by joint monetization with Israel, which has been discussed a great deal. The Cypriots hope very much that the Israelis will agree that the gas from the Leviathan field that should be on stream in 2017 should be sent to Cyprus.
"And if you pull Cypriot and Israeli gas (together), there will then be sufficient quantity that will interest energy investors. Until now, Israelis have shown no interest in this. Their famous report from an intergovernmental committee — now a year and a half ago — strongly advises that Israel should retain the control of its own gas. And maybe much further down the road, people may think about this.”
Leigh was highly doubtful whether Turkey would be moved to take a more forthcoming position on the Cyprus question due to energy issues, especially with Turkey's prospects for other energy imports.
As for Israel, although there is word in the Ankara beltway that Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz is courting Davutoglu for a speedy reconciliation with the Jewish state, all bets seem to be going south, making normalization an unrealistic expectation for now. Further signaling that all bets are off, on May 26, an Istanbul court ordered the arrest of four former senior Israeli military officers who the court believes are directly responsible for the deaths of 10 Turks who were aboard the Mavi Marmara in May 2010. This political conundrum certainly prevents the energy talks from moving forward between the two countries. Yet, there is no doubt that the pipeline from Israel to Turkey will be much less expensive than a floating LNG plant.
“Because of the hostility of the Turkish government to Israel, Israelis would not want to put all their eggs in the same basket in exporting its gas. What happens if Turkey does what Russia did, like turning off the tap one day?” Leigh said. “Talking to senior officials in Israel, they seem to take the view: If Turkish companies are ready to make the investment, run the risk, they are not going to block it.”
Israel’s immediate priority seems to be exporting to neighboring countries such as Jordan, Palestinian lands and, possibly, Egypt. In other words, the companies concerned are far from decided whether exporting to Turkey is feasible.
Leigh said there are two possible routes for a pipeline from Israel to Turkey. One is from Israel through the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Syrian EEZ, and the other is through the Cyprus EEZ. “As far as the law of the sea is concerned, a coastal state does not have the right to veto a pipeline passing through its EEZ, but it has to approve the route that the pipeline takes. So, de facto it provides a veto,” Leigh said.
This means that Lebanon and Syria have de facto veto rights on Israeli gas exports to Turkey. It looks unlikely for now that companies would run the risk of this route, given events in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, the Cyprus EEZ route would be the only route they would consider, and the Cyprus government would have to approve.
In sum, Leigh does not consider the new hydrocarbon reserves to be an agent of peace-building efforts in the region. “If there is a political breakthrough, either on Cyprus or on Israel, the energy cooperation can reinforce it. … Clearly, the pipelines will create a new common interest, but it is not the motive (to enforce these countries to settle their score and finally make peace). Once they settle their political differences, it will reinforce the peace,” he said.
According to Leigh, the more convincing reason as to why Turkey might be interested normalizing its relations with Israel is the following. “When relations between Israel and Turkey were close, there was a tremendous area of military cooperation. The Israeli air force had used Turkish airspace for its exercises, and they in return provided transfer of military technology,” Leigh said. “Now, Israel has switched its military cooperation to Cyprus and Greece. Turkey and Greece still have their issues, and, obviously, the Cyprus issue is unresolved. This is a much greater national security threat to Turkey than this energy issue.”
Even if this is the case, in the words of an Israeli diplomatic source, “Turkey is quite an unpredictable partner for us under (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip) Erdogan’s leadership, and we have no interest to be part of Turkey’s domestic politics, at least up until the presidential elections in August. We will see what comes after then."
Link to source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/eastern-mediterranean-gas-cyprus-greek-cypriots-biden.html
Biden’s May 21 arrival on Cyprus marked the most senior US official visit to the island in more than five decades.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called Biden’s meeting with Turkish Cypriot President Dervis Eroglu a “historic step,” providing ample encouragement for a fair and just settlement of the Cyprus issue. “Biden’s message, which demonstrates an equidistant approach to the parties, is positive, according to us,” Davutoglu said May 23.
To what extent will the discovery of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean play a role in progress on the Cyprus problem, or on efforts toward a Turkish-Israeli reconciliation? After all, Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar offshore natural gas fields are greater in amount and depth than Cyprus’ Aphrodite and Block 12 reserves.
The underlying assumption is twofold: that Turkey will, for the foreseeable future, have a ferocious demand for gas to feed its economy, and that Turkey envisions itself as an energy transit hub between Central Asia, the southern Caucasus and Europe. In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean gas is very attractive to Turkey, regardless of its amount and regardless of whether it could really provide an opportunity to free Turkey from dependence on Russian and Iranian imports.
Michael Leigh, of the German Marshall Fund and a former EU Commission director-general for enlargement, told Al-Monitor, “This assumption can be challenged on economic grounds before you come to any political issues which are at stake.” Leigh wondered whether Turkey would position its policy on these highly political questions regarding the hydrocarbon deposits in Cyprus and Israel.
Leigh began his argument questioning Turkey’s future demand for gas. “This very much depends on the growth rate of the Turkish economy. Certainly, if you project the kind of growth rates that Turkey has enjoyed over the last decade, you might conclude that Turkey needs to add to its energy supply from any sources whatsoever,” he said. “However, growth has now slowed down tremendously in Turkey. It is very hard for us to project forward and to know what that demand will be in the future.”
Turkey has a number of other sources of gas that are far greater in scale than what might ever be available in the Eastern Mediterranean, said Leigh, with Russia at the top of the list. “Of course, Turkey has an interest in the European Union diversifying away from Russia to some degree,” he said. “But there is no way the Eastern Mediterranean (gas) could make a significant dent in the 60% of gas Turkey is currently buying from Russia. Also, Turkey can look to Azerbaijan and to Iran as important sources of gas.”
Leigh also puts a big question mark over the price issue. “It is still too early to say what price either Israel or Cyprus will be ready to sell gas to Turkey. But costs in Eastern Mediterranean are rather high,” he said. “And it is very far from certain that Turkey will be ready to pay the price that the companies in the Eastern Mediterranean would need to get a decent return on their investment. There is all that by way of uncertainty.”
A prominent source in the Turkish Energy Ministry said Turkey is not concerned a bit about any of the above. “There are not enough deposits of hydrocarbons in the Aphrodite gas field or Block 12, but the Greek Cypriots remain hopeful for coming up with new discoveries. Speaking for now, though, it is not feasible for any investor to spend the money on infrastructure to bring the hydrocarbons to the surface,” the official told Al-Monitor.
“To us, it is their problem whether they find additional reserves or whether they want to export these hydrocarbons at any given time. If they do want to export them, however, it is clear that Turkey is the best route and therefore they will realize that it is also in their best interest to find a justly negotiated settlement of the Cyprus issue.” He added, “When their politics come to this realization, we will be happy to sit down and talk about it in detail.”
So far, the scale of discoveries in Cyprus has been considerately below expectations, making an investment for a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant out of question. Leigh said that Noble energy, TOTAL and ENI are drilling to find new gas deposits, and stressed that building floating LNG plants is a costly investment. “For an LNG plant to be commercially viable it needs two trains (liquefaction facilities). … One train LNG plant costs $6 billion. Two trains cost $9 billion and three trains cost $12 billion,” Leigh said. “And to get a good economic return, you really need these two (trains). So, the court is out as to whether Cyprus is going to find sufficient quantities in order for the export options to be viable. The other main idea as to how Cyprus could have enough quantity to justify export infrastructure is by joint monetization with Israel, which has been discussed a great deal. The Cypriots hope very much that the Israelis will agree that the gas from the Leviathan field that should be on stream in 2017 should be sent to Cyprus.
"And if you pull Cypriot and Israeli gas (together), there will then be sufficient quantity that will interest energy investors. Until now, Israelis have shown no interest in this. Their famous report from an intergovernmental committee — now a year and a half ago — strongly advises that Israel should retain the control of its own gas. And maybe much further down the road, people may think about this.”
Leigh was highly doubtful whether Turkey would be moved to take a more forthcoming position on the Cyprus question due to energy issues, especially with Turkey's prospects for other energy imports.
As for Israel, although there is word in the Ankara beltway that Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz is courting Davutoglu for a speedy reconciliation with the Jewish state, all bets seem to be going south, making normalization an unrealistic expectation for now. Further signaling that all bets are off, on May 26, an Istanbul court ordered the arrest of four former senior Israeli military officers who the court believes are directly responsible for the deaths of 10 Turks who were aboard the Mavi Marmara in May 2010. This political conundrum certainly prevents the energy talks from moving forward between the two countries. Yet, there is no doubt that the pipeline from Israel to Turkey will be much less expensive than a floating LNG plant.
“Because of the hostility of the Turkish government to Israel, Israelis would not want to put all their eggs in the same basket in exporting its gas. What happens if Turkey does what Russia did, like turning off the tap one day?” Leigh said. “Talking to senior officials in Israel, they seem to take the view: If Turkish companies are ready to make the investment, run the risk, they are not going to block it.”
Israel’s immediate priority seems to be exporting to neighboring countries such as Jordan, Palestinian lands and, possibly, Egypt. In other words, the companies concerned are far from decided whether exporting to Turkey is feasible.
Leigh said there are two possible routes for a pipeline from Israel to Turkey. One is from Israel through the Lebanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Syrian EEZ, and the other is through the Cyprus EEZ. “As far as the law of the sea is concerned, a coastal state does not have the right to veto a pipeline passing through its EEZ, but it has to approve the route that the pipeline takes. So, de facto it provides a veto,” Leigh said.
This means that Lebanon and Syria have de facto veto rights on Israeli gas exports to Turkey. It looks unlikely for now that companies would run the risk of this route, given events in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, the Cyprus EEZ route would be the only route they would consider, and the Cyprus government would have to approve.
In sum, Leigh does not consider the new hydrocarbon reserves to be an agent of peace-building efforts in the region. “If there is a political breakthrough, either on Cyprus or on Israel, the energy cooperation can reinforce it. … Clearly, the pipelines will create a new common interest, but it is not the motive (to enforce these countries to settle their score and finally make peace). Once they settle their political differences, it will reinforce the peace,” he said.
According to Leigh, the more convincing reason as to why Turkey might be interested normalizing its relations with Israel is the following. “When relations between Israel and Turkey were close, there was a tremendous area of military cooperation. The Israeli air force had used Turkish airspace for its exercises, and they in return provided transfer of military technology,” Leigh said. “Now, Israel has switched its military cooperation to Cyprus and Greece. Turkey and Greece still have their issues, and, obviously, the Cyprus issue is unresolved. This is a much greater national security threat to Turkey than this energy issue.”
Even if this is the case, in the words of an Israeli diplomatic source, “Turkey is quite an unpredictable partner for us under (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip) Erdogan’s leadership, and we have no interest to be part of Turkey’s domestic politics, at least up until the presidential elections in August. We will see what comes after then."
Link to source: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/eastern-mediterranean-gas-cyprus-greek-cypriots-biden.html
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
Scotland and Cyprus agree link to study CO2 storage in eastern Med | Click Green
Scotland and Cyprus agree link to study CO2 storage in eastern Med
by ClickGreen staff. Published Wed 21 May 2014 00:01, Last updated: 2014-05-21
The agreement between the University of Nicosia’s Centre for Green Development and Energy Policy (CGD) and Scottish Carbon Capture & Storage (SCCS) will now seek funding for researchers from across the European Union to work together to identify likely geological CO2 storage sites beneath the Mediterranean Sea to the south of Cyprus.
Using methodology developed in previous SCCS projects to assess CO2 storage capacity in the North Sea, the scientists will study seismic data and other information to build a picture of storage sites – including depleted oil and gas reservoirs and saline aquifers – which could boost Cyprus’s capacity for tackling carbon emissions.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) – a chain of technologies that captures and stores CO2 from large point sources – could help countries manage their carbon footprint if used at commercial scale. However, CCS relies on the availability of suitable storage sites.
Professor Stuart Haszedine, a SCCS director, announced the Memorandum of Understanding between SCCS and CGD in a speech today at the All-Energy 2014 conference in Aberdeen.
Prof Haszeldine said: “Our research agreement with the University of Nicosia’s Centre for Green Development is an exciting development for SCCS.
“It brings together expertise from both research groups for the shared goal of opening up new opportunities for CO2 storage, as a fledgling hydrocarbons industry in Cyprus plans its future. It will also provide excellent training opportunities for staff and students.”
Dr Marios Valiantis, director of the Centre for Green Development and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia said: “Cyprus is getting ready for what we hope will be a big new offshore oil and gas industry.
“The Government has said that it would like to progress plans for CCS too, following the European CCS Directive. This led us to the expertise of SCCS and Professor Haszeldine, and we look forward to working with SCCS to jointly develop some plans to put before the government of Cyprus.
“By developing Carbon Capture and Storage alongside the hydrocarbon industry, we aim to grow our economy without contributing to climate change.”
Link to source: http://www.clickgreen.org.uk/news/international-news/124657-scotland-and-cyprus-agree-link-to-study-co2-storage-in-eastern-mediterranean.html
Monday, May 26, 2014
The Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Between Turkey and “TRNC” | EJIL
May 26, 2014, Nikolaos Ioannidis*Last month, Turkey submitted a note verbale to the Secretary-General of the United Nations setting out the geographical coordinates of its continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean, as established by a delimitation agreement with the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). The agreement was signed on 21 September 2011 and ratified by the Turkish government on 29 June 2012. A map published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs depicting the agreement is pictured below. (The reasons why the “TRNC” is in quotation marks will be elaborated below.) By transmitting this document to the UN Secretary-General, Turkey sought to achieve the publication of the agreed coordinates in the Law of the Sea Bulletin (LSB), where official submissions by states regarding the law of the sea are published. Although Turkey has not acceded the UN Law of the Sea Convention (‘LOSC’), it acted in accordance with article 84(2) LOSC (due publicity of charts or lists of geographical coordinates regarding continental shelf delimitation). Nonetheless, the submission of Turkey was not listed as an official deposit on the website of the Department of Oceans and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).
The Turkish approach on the regime of islands
The delimitation agreement outlines some of Turkey’s longstanding positions on the law of the sea. It deals only with the continental shelf and does not provide for the delineation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). While there is nothing precluding coastal states from choosing which maritime zones to claim and/or to delimitate, Turkey’s choice not to delimit an EEZ with the “TRNC” alludes to the Turkish position that islands in certain regions (implying the Aegean Sea) should not be entitled to claim maritime zones of their own other than territorial sea or should have reduced capacity to generate such zones. This stance was formulated in the context of the dispute between Turkey and Greece concerning sovereignty over the maritime space of the Aegean Sea; since the 1970s, Turkey has sustained that the Aegean islands are situated on the continental shelf of Anatolia (Turkey) and, consequently, do not have a continental shelf of their own. This matter was an apple of discord between the Turkish and the Greek delegations over the course of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS III’). In the end, by virtue of article 121(2) LOSC, the Conference recognised the rights of islands to generate maritime zones. Article 121 LOSC reflects customary law (ICJ, Nicaragua v Colombia (2012), para 139) and, accordingly, applies to non-states parties as well.
Turkey’s resentment at the provisions on the regime of islands was one of the reasons it voted against and has not yet acceded to the LOSC (see Plenary Meetings 160 and 189). For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that when it comes to maritime delimitation, the maritime space an island can claim may be diminished depending on the circumstances (see, e.g., Anglo-French Arbitration 1977, Tunisia v Libya 1982, Black Sea Case 2009, Bangladesh/Myanmar 2012). Therefore, although in principle islands are not deprived of the rights bestowed on them by article 121 LOSC, they may not always be granted full effect in maritime boundary delimitations. However, islands cannot be denied their capacity to generate maritime zones and/or to be given decreased effect a priori; each case should be scrutinised according to its own unique terms. In any event, the Turkish argument that the Greek islands in the Aegean are located on the continental shelf of Turkey has been severely emaciated by the introduction of the EEZ concept and the prevalence of the “distance criterion” of maritime delimitation over the “geological” one. The distance criterion provides that the breadth of the maritime space afforded to a state should be calculated according to a fixed distance measured from the coast. The geological criterion, by contrast, would permit a state to claim the sea waters lying over the “natural prolongation” of its territory irrespective of the distance from its coastline. In the Nicaragua v Colombia case (2012), the ICJ put an end to the argument that one state’s islands cannot have their own continental shelf because they are located on another state’s continental shelf:
“The Court does not believe that any weight should be given to Nicaragua’s contention that the Colombian islands are located on “Nicaragua’s continental shelf”. It has repeatedly made clear that geological and geomorphological considerations are not relevant to the delimitation of overlapping entitlements within 200 nautical miles of the coasts of States.” (para 214).
The delimitation agreement
According to its well-established position that islands should not have the capacity to claim extended maritime zones when facing a bigger coastline, Turkey holds the view that Cyprus, being an island, has lesser effect in terms of maritime delimitation than the longer Turkish coastline, which is opposite the northern coast of Cyprus. Hence, as the agreement provides, the continental shelf delineation was carried out in accordance with equitable principles, resulting in a delimitation line closer to Cyprus at some points, which gives Turkey a more extensive maritime space than that allocated to the “TRNC”. Turkey was a fervent advocate of the equitable principles/relevant circumstances method during UNCLOS III, vehemently rejecting the median line/special circumstances method (UNCLOS III, Negotiating Group 7). The “equitable principles” method, which was elaborated in the 1969 Continental Shelf cases, stipulates that all relevant factors should be considered in order to reach an equitable result; however, the Court gave no further guidance as to how such an equitable result would be reached, rendering this method equivocal.
Although the debate over these two delimitation methods was intense, the LOSC did not manage to elucidate the vagueness surrounding the law of maritime delimitation; articles 74 and 83 LOSC merely strike a balance between the two opposing sides’ assertions. Nevertheless, there has been a growing trend towards assimilation of the two methods, early signs of which are discernable in several cases before international tribunals [Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration (para 148), Jan Mayen case (para 56), Qatar v Bahrain case (para 231)]. At the moment, the view supporting the integration of the two methods seems to prevail [International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) Bangladesh/Myanmar case (para 238)].
Of course, the looming reconciliation of these delimitation methods does not preclude states from agreeing to designate their maritime boundaries using only one of them. In the case under consideration, though, things are not that simple. Turkey concluded an agreement with a regime established in the aftermath of the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in 1974, which entailed use of force in violation of article 2(4) UN Charter. The “TRNC” was established in 1983 in northern Cyprus, which has been occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces since 1974. Security Council resolutions 541/1983 and 550/1984 condemned this secessionist action and reaffirmed that the sole legitimate government on the island was the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights resolved that the “TRNC” is a “puppet state” under the “effective control” of Turkey [Loizidou v Turkey, App. No. 15318/89 (18 December 1996) paras 56 and 57; Cyprus v Turkey, App. No. 25781/94 (10 May 2001) paras 77, 78 and 80; Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99 (22 December 2005) para 27]. Also, the ICJ confirmed the illegality of the regime established in northern Cyprus in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion(para 81). Thus, the regime in northern Cyprus is illegal and cannot claim statehood, as it is ‘a putative state emerged … with the assistance of foreign military intervention’ (James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd edn OUP 2006, p. 144).
Conclusion
Consequently, the continental shelf delimitation agreement between Turkey and the breakaway “TRNC” is not valid under international law, as the latter party is not a legitimate state entity. It thus cannot be accepted by the DOALOS as a lawful submission and be published in the LSB. As expected, the foregoing development triggered a reaction from the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, whose governments deplored the submission and deemed the agreement unacceptable. Another controversial matter to be contemplated is whether this agreement would be binding upon the Republic of Cyprus should a solution to the Cyprus Problem –which concerns the enduring occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish Armed Forces since 1974- be reached, given the unequal terms of the delimitation. Further, it will be interesting to see whether Turkey will be keen to conclude any maritime delimitation agreements with Greece in the Aegean Sea/Eastern Mediterranean in light of the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits therein and, if so, according to which method such delineations will be effected.
This incident illustrates the pivotal role international law can play in international relations. Turkey, a non-state party to the LOSC, realised that unless it acted in conformity with international law, the delimitation agreement would not have any legal standing. Therefore, it followed the rules set forth by the LOSC regarding the deposit of geographic coordinates of the continental shelf purporting to legitimise the agreement, even though the instrument in question cannot have any legal consequences due to the unlawfulness of the “TRNC”. Although a non-state party to the LOSC, Turkey was willing or compelled to conform to rules with which it disagrees in order to promote its interests. Moreover, this incident supports the argument that observing international law norms is the best way for states to pursue their legitimate rights. The law of the sea must be the tool for resolving disagreements on maritime affairs in the region, especially in view of the discovery of new oil and gas resources and the prospective benefits they hold for states of the region.
* Nikolaos A. Ioannidis is a PhD candidate in Public International Law at University of Bristol. His doctoral thesis focuses on the application of the Law of the Sea in the Eastern Mediterranean in light of the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits in the seabed and subsoil of the region. Other fields of interest: Law of Armed Conflict, Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence.
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