December 18 2017 12:39:00
ANKARA - Anadolu Agency
Turkey’s first drillship, the Deepsea Metro 2, is expected to arrive in Turkey by the end of December in preparation for exploratory offshore drilling in the Mediterranean Sea at the beginning of next year, shipping data showed on Dec. 18.
The data showed that the ship, which will be used by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), left Norway’s Hoylandsbygda port and is expected to arrive in Turkey on Dec. 31.
Turkey has already undertaken oil and gas exploration using two seismic ships, but the Deepsea Metro 2 will be the country’s first active drillship.
The South Korean merchant vessel was produced in 2011, has a length of 229 meters (751 feet), and is capable of drilling into a maximum depth of 40,000 feet.
Showing posts with label Hurriyet Daily News. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hurriyet Daily News. Show all posts
Monday, December 18, 2017
Thursday, June 1, 2017
Turkish group to buy majority stake in gas distribution company from Gazprom - HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
June/01/2017
Turkey’s Şen Group has struck a deal with Gazprom to buy a 71 percent stake in the Bosphorus Gaz Corp, a natural gas distribution company, it said in a statement on June 1.
Following approvals from energy and competition authorities, the group will assume ownership all of the gas distribution company, Turkey’s first private natural gas importer.
“Our decision to acquire all the stakes of Bosphorus Gaz shows our confidence in Turkey’s strong economic performance and high growth potential in the energy sector,” said Bosphorus Gaz Managing Director Adnan Şen.
Turkey’s Şen Group has struck a deal with Gazprom to buy a 71 percent stake in the Bosphorus Gaz Corp, a natural gas distribution company, it said in a statement on June 1.
Following approvals from energy and competition authorities, the group will assume ownership all of the gas distribution company, Turkey’s first private natural gas importer.
“Our decision to acquire all the stakes of Bosphorus Gaz shows our confidence in Turkey’s strong economic performance and high growth potential in the energy sector,” said Bosphorus Gaz Managing Director Adnan Şen.
Thursday, April 13, 2017
EU backs Israel-to-Italy pipeline to alter East Med energy chessboard - HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
| Ministers of Cyprus, Italy, Israel & Greece, with EU Commissioner |
Micha'el Tanchum
On April 3, the European Union and the governments of Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Israel pledged their support for the construction of the world’s longest undersea natural gas pipeline to transport Eastern Mediterranean gas to EU markets via Greece and Italy. Costing over $6 billion, the more than 2,000-kilometer mega-pipeline could transform the energy geopolitics of the region. The so-called Cross-Med (East Med) pipeline would reduce the EU’s reliance on Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) as the major supply route for non-Russian natural gas.
Friday, February 10, 2017
Turkey’s giant gas storage facility opens - HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
February/10/2017
Turkey’s Tuz Lake gas storage facility, which is expected to increase capacity from 1.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) to as much as 5 bcm per year, was opened in an official ceremony on Feb. 10 in the Central Anatolian province of Aksaray.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan thanked officials and businesspeople who took part in the development of the project, noting that another key investment would take place again in the same area.
“In addition to the facility with a 1.2 bcm of gas capacity, which we have opened today, we are also starting a new investment today. With this new investment, the gas storage capacity will increase up to 5.4 bcm. When this investment becomes online, Turkey’s daily gas storage capacity will rise to 80 million cubic meters,” he said.
Turkey’s Tuz Lake gas storage facility, which is expected to increase capacity from 1.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) to as much as 5 bcm per year, was opened in an official ceremony on Feb. 10 in the Central Anatolian province of Aksaray.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan thanked officials and businesspeople who took part in the development of the project, noting that another key investment would take place again in the same area.
“In addition to the facility with a 1.2 bcm of gas capacity, which we have opened today, we are also starting a new investment today. With this new investment, the gas storage capacity will increase up to 5.4 bcm. When this investment becomes online, Turkey’s daily gas storage capacity will rise to 80 million cubic meters,” he said.
Friday, December 9, 2016
The last word has not been said in Cyprus - HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
December/09/2016
Fikret Bila
The Cyprus issue is not independent of the Syrian issue. But while the imperialist intervention that has dragged Syria and Iraq into civil war and divided both still continues, the Cyprus talks have accelerated.
After Syria was partitioned and its north was left to the PKK-PYD, and after a corridor was opened to the Mediterranean, the strategic significance of Cyprus’ Karpasia Peninsula multiplied from Ankara’s perspective.
At a time when the EU doors have been firmly closed to Turkey and when Syria is about to be partitioned, the situation of the (self-delcared, recognized only by Turkey) "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" is of strategic importance. In such a process, it would not be wise to say “yes” to a model in which the Turkish Cypriots give away the Karpasia Peninsula. If it did so, Turkey would never be able to protect its rights or its future in the East Mediterranean.
Fikret Bila
The Cyprus issue is not independent of the Syrian issue. But while the imperialist intervention that has dragged Syria and Iraq into civil war and divided both still continues, the Cyprus talks have accelerated.
After Syria was partitioned and its north was left to the PKK-PYD, and after a corridor was opened to the Mediterranean, the strategic significance of Cyprus’ Karpasia Peninsula multiplied from Ankara’s perspective.
At a time when the EU doors have been firmly closed to Turkey and when Syria is about to be partitioned, the situation of the (self-delcared, recognized only by Turkey) "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" is of strategic importance. In such a process, it would not be wise to say “yes” to a model in which the Turkish Cypriots give away the Karpasia Peninsula. If it did so, Turkey would never be able to protect its rights or its future in the East Mediterranean.
Saturday, October 1, 2016
Azerbaijani parliament approves TANAP project - HURRIYET DAILY NEWS / ANADOLU AGENCY
October/01/2016BAKU - Anadolu Agency
National Parliament of Azerbaijan Republic approved Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project on Sept. 30.
Azerbaijani Parliament discussed issues including the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey during the first meeting of the autumn.
The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Valeh Alasgarov, noted that Turkey has already implemented all necessary state procedures on the TANAP project.
He underlined that the approval of the Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries was signed on May 26, 2014.
National Parliament of Azerbaijan Republic approved Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project on Sept. 30.
Azerbaijani Parliament discussed issues including the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey during the first meeting of the autumn.
The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Valeh Alasgarov, noted that Turkey has already implemented all necessary state procedures on the TANAP project.
He underlined that the approval of the Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries was signed on May 26, 2014.
Friday, July 1, 2016
Israeli gas may reach Turkey in three years, Israeli energy minister says - HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
Merve Erdil - ISTANBUL
As Turkey and Israel move to restore their relationship after six years of strained ties, both sides are looking forward to the opportunity to transfer Israel’s natural gas to Turkey, a move which could happen as early as 2019, according to Israeli Energy and Natural Resources Minister Yuval Steinitz.
“I think that it is quite likely that Israel will export natural gas to Turkey. And maybe also in the future we will export natural gas to Europe through the Turkish gas transmission system that is now under construction. I think it is good for Turkey. It is good for Israel,” Steinitz told daily Hürriyet over the phone on June 29.
Turkey and Israel reached an agreement earlier this week that will allow the two countries to restore full diplomatic relations, which broke off in 2010 after Israeli forces raided a convoy of aid ships attempting to break the blockade of Gaza, killing nine Turkish activists.
Wednesday, November 25, 2015
Egypt: The catalyst for a new eastern Mediterranean gas hub? | Hurriyet Daily News
Egypt: The catalyst for a new eastern Mediterranean gas hub?
Simone Tagliapietra/ Georg Zachmann
In recent years, the eastern Mediterranean has been a hot topic in international gas markets. Since the Tamar and Leviathan fields off the shore of Israel and the Aphrodite field off of Cyprus were discovered in 2009-2011, a number of export options have been discussed, including pipelines to Turkey or Greece and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants in Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.Analysts have expressed hopes that the new gas discoveries might also pave the way for a new era of economic and political stability in the region. However, despite high expectations, progress has been slow. In Israel, this was due to long-lasting internal political debate and uncertainty about the management of the gas discovered, while in Cyprus, the initial enthusiasm has been tempered by successive downward revisions of the expected resources.
But the discovery of the Zohr gas field in offshore Egypt, the largest ever made in the Mediterranean Sea, has revived hopes for further cooperation on natural gas in the Middle East. Regional geopolitics will ultimately decide whether this new development remains confined to Egypt or affects the overall eastern Mediterranean region.
The development of Zohr will primarily serve the Egyptian domestic market, making up for a rapid decline in production which has left the country increasingly struggling to meet its domestic demand. Egypt even started to import LNG in 2015 through two floating storage and regasification units leased for five years. Accordingly, Egypt’s LNG exports dropped from a starting level of about 15 bcm/year in 2005 to almost zero in 2014, leaving the country’s two LNG plants completely idle. With a potential 20-year plateau production level of 20-30 bcm/year, Zohr would thus be a major relief for Egypt’s constrained gas market.
Zohr could be the first of a new string of oil discoveries off the shore of Egypt. International oil and gas companies have already started to increase exploration in the area, and if Zohr and other offshore fields reach their full potential in the 2020s, Egypt might by that time again become an LNG exporter.
The impact of the Zohr gas field could well go beyond Egypt’s boundaries, due to its location and infrastructure. Zohr is close to the gas fields of Aphrodite and Leviathan, allowing the development of the fields to be coordinated, and the economies of scale needed to put in place a competitive regional gas export infrastructure.
Egypt already has LNG export infrastructure in place in Idku and Damietta, which is currently sitting idle. Putting this into use would allow gas to be exported from Zohr and other Egyptian fields not used in the home market. Given the growing domestic demand in Egypt, it is fair to assume that some export capacity would be left for Israeli and Cypriot gas – if it could be brought to the Egyptian terminals. As both LNG plants can be expanded, Israeli and Cypriot developers would have a flexible outlet.
For Israel and Cyprus, cooperating with other players in the region is crucial. Building the export infrastructure and developing the fields is a circular problem: if there are political or commercial risks that no export infrastructure will be in place when the production starts, a lot of money will be lost. If the field underperforms compared to expectations, expensive export infrastructure (the Cypriot LNG Vasilikos project is estimated to cost USD 6 billion) will sit idle. Consequently, bringing together an underused and scalable export infrastructure with several promising fields could be the key to unlocking untapped regional potential.
Egypt holds the keys to the Eastern Mediterranean gas future. It could decide to proceed alone by exporting the gas volumes that will progressively become available on top of the domestic demand, or it might decide to proceed together with Israel and Cyprus, by creating a new eastern Mediterranean gas hub based on its existing exporting infrastructure.
Creating a new eastern Mediterranean gas hub would present benefits for all players involved, allowing Egypt to enhance its role in the region and secure revenue from a transit scheme, and Israel and Cyprus to fully exploit their gas reserves. It would also present an opportunity for Europe, where imports requirements will grow post 2020 due to declining domestic production and the expiration of long-term contracts with Norway and Russia.
Albeit commercially sound, the realization of a new eastern Mediterranean gas hub will ultimately depend on foreign policy considerations and domestic politics in Israel and Egypt. Public opinion in both countries will be critical of tight cooperation in such a strategic sector.
For its part, the EU should support a regional cooperation scheme aimed at developing an eastern Mediterranean gas hub, for both energy policy and foreign policy considerations. In terms of energy policy, this initiative could provide much-needed substance to the long-lasting EU gas supply diversification strategy. In terms of foreign policy, this initiative could allow international collaboration in an area that otherwise currently presents very few opportunities for cooperation.
*Simone Tagliapietra is a visiting fellow at Bruegel and a senior researcher at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
**Georg Zachmann is a research fellow at Bruegel and a member of the GermanAdvisory Group in Ukraine and the German Economic Team in Belarus and Moldova.
November/25/2015
Source: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/egypt-the-catalyst-for-a-new-eastern-mediterranean-gas-hub.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91626&NewsCatID=396
Thursday, November 19, 2015
Choppy waters surround Eastern Mediterranean gas prospects | Hurriyet Daily News
Choppy waters surround Eastern Mediterranean gas prospects
JOHN ROBERTS*
Egypt’s discovery of the eastern Mediterranean’s biggest offshore gas field radically changes the outlook for development of one of the world’s most geopolitically fascinating energy provinces.Zohr, with an initial estimate of some 30 trillion cubic feet (TCF, close to one trillion cubic metres) of reserves, will certainly provide a major boost for Egypt, which has had to curtail natural gas exports because domestic demand has risen so sharply.
But the problem for its neighbours is that while it will certainly boost overall regional output it may well damage the prospects for regional exports. This paradox is due to the near-certainty that Egypt will use the field primarily to serve for its own rapidly growing and still largely subsidised export market. Any gas left over will then be available for export thus boosting the prospects for re-opening the currently closed Damietta and Idku gas liquefaction plants that used to supply Europe, and France in particular, with liquefied natural gas (LNG).
The country most affected by this is Israel, since, until the discovery of the 30 trillion cubic feet (tcf) Zohr in August, it had been assumed that of Israel’s own major offshore discoveries, the 10 tcf Tamar and the 20 tcf Leviathan field, both would be used by Egypt both domestically and as feedstock for processing at Idku and Damietta.
Israel says that it is still pursuing this approach, but the discovery of Zohr and the impending development of BP’s 1.5 tcf Atoll field in Egyptian waters, may reduce Egypt’s interest in the idea of importing Israeli gas, regardless of whether it is for domestic use or for re-export via the LNG plants. If so, then for the foreseeable future Israel’s gas will be confined to its own domestic market and to limited sales to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.
Cyprus, which is still hoping to find more gas after the discovery of the relatively modest 4.54 tcf Aphrodite field in 2011, is now focussing on a twin track approach. The prime concern of the Cypriot Government, which controls the southern regions of the island, is to get the gas ashore so that it can start to substitute its own gas for expensively imported fuel oil at its power stations. The other is to see whether a pipeline might be built to connect Aphrodite to Egypt’s offshore gas gathering system so that it could be sold directly to Egypt, or made available for indirect export through processing into LNG at Idku or Damietta. This approach was discussed in high level Egyptian-Cypriot talks in October.
Both Israel and Cyprus have suffered from getting their timing wrong. In the year or so after Aphrodite’s discovery, Israel was seeking to evaluate just how much could be allowed to go for export. At this stage, the government wanted to ensure the retention of most of the gas for prospective domestic use. This was considered crucial since Israel had suffered grievously from reliance on Egyptian gas imports, a policy which proved unwise when the lines carrying that gas were repeatedly bombed and put out of action by militant groups operating in northern Sinai, the forerunners of the Daesh franchise now widely considered responsible for the destruction of the Russian airliner that exploded after leaving the resort of Sharm el Sheikh on October 31.
The Israeli Government’s restrictions on the amount of gas that was to be made available for export have already caused one major prospective investor, Australia’s Woodside, to lose interest. And since Woodside had the expertise for developing offshore LNG gasification facilities, together with the recent decline in international gas prices, this meant that Israel has had to start again in thinking just how it might develop gas exports. This also helps to explain why Noble Energy, the principal foreign investor in the group of companies that found Tamar, Leviathan and a cluster of smaller fields (and which is also the leader of the consortium that found Aphrodite), is contemplating legal action against the Israeli Government, on possible charges that it caused overlong delays to the development of Leviathan.
If so, then not only would Noble potentially be seeking billions of dollars in damages, but the field’s development would likely be put on hold pending the outcome of hearings before the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) International Court of Arbitration, a process that could take several years.
But, until the question of any court case is settled, further development of Israel’s biggest field will be limited and long- or even middle-distance export prospects put firmly on hold. Despite hopes that some 4.5 bcm/y of gas from Tamar can be sold to Spain’s Union Fenosa, which operates the Damietta LNG plant, for processing and sale as LNG to European customers, it is hard to see how export volumes of this scale can be squared with the Israeli Government’s determination to secure guaranteed supplies for the Israeli domestic market and its largely political desire to provide basic levels of gas to Jordan and the Palestinians.
As for Turkey, for the time being it has to sit on the side lines and await further developments. In purely commercial terms, the coastal cities and industrial zones of southern Turkey remain the obvious market for whatever gas in the eastern Mediterranean should became available for export by pipeline. Moreover, exporting to Turkey by pipeline is simply impossible unless the Cyprus problem is solved since any line connecting the Israeli fields would have to pass through waters that lie within Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone.
As for Cyprus, it faces an odd conundrum. Israeli officials believe the Aphrodite field extends into Israeli waters. If so, this would indicate that Aphrodite is somewhat larger than previously thought. However, actual field development would require a unitisation agreement between Cyprus and Israel to tackle the issue of how much gas each should get from the field. And while the two countries have settled their maritime boundary, they have yet to conclude a unitisation agreement.
Yet there are grounds for hope. There are serious ongoing efforts to end the partition of Cyprus. The leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, President Nicos Anastasiades of the Government of Cyprus and Mustafa Akıncı, who heads the generally unrecognised self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, enjoy good personal relations. But perhaps the most significant factor is that Mr. Akıncı, from his time as Mayor of the Turkish sector of Nicosia, has a striking record in achieving cooperation in practical matters concerning the provision of sewerage and electricity across the Green Line that divides the two communities.
Should the Greek Cypriots succeed in persuading Noble to start bring the gas from Aphrodite onshore in the next year or two, it would improve the island’s energy balance – and its environment – significantly. And since the leaders of both communities have pledged that offshore energy will be used to develop the island as a whole, some of the electricity generated from Aphrodite’s gas will likely flow to the north.
With northern Cyprus now receiving water by pipeline from southern Turkey, perhaps it is not too fanciful to see water flowing south and electricity flowing north as elements in a renewed effort to build bridges between the two communities and, ultimately, to end the partition of Cyprus.
*John Roberts is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center.
November/19/2015
Source: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/choppy-waters-surround-eastern-mediterranean-gas-prospects.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91417&NewsCatID=572
Monday, December 29, 2014
Russian project jeopardizes Turkey’s energy advantage | Hurriyet Daily News
Russian project jeopardizes Turkey’s energy advantage
Barçın Yinanç - barcin.yinanc@hdn.com.tr
Russia’s proposal to sell gas to Europe via Turkey with the so-called ‘Turkish Stream’ will jeopardize Ankara’s strategic importance, according to an energy expert. Turkey’s advantage stems from providing an alternative to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russia, says Mithat Balkan, a former Turkish energy envoy
Accepting Moscow’s proposal would make Turkey even more dependent on Russian gas, says Mithat Balkan adding saying no to Russia would not hamper bilateral ties. HÜRRİYET photos, Levent KULU
Were you surprised when Russia canceled the South Stream project?
I was surprised, but it seemed to come with the stance the EU had taken against Russia. With the unbundling issue [EU provision, which requires the separation of gas production and sale operation from the transmission networks, to the effect that a single company may not both own and operate a gas pipeline] and the EU’s strict attitude to not have Russia dominate that part of Europe; it seemed it was going to happen, but such a swift action was a surprise for everyone.
Where you among those who never believed in the project?
I was always skeptical about it, but one has to go back to the past to assess the presence. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Erzurum-Ceyhan (BTE) projects were policy decisions made by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the United States with the objective to provide Caucasus and Central Asian energy sources to European markets, which would guarantee their [the energy producing states] independence and to giveEurope and the world an alternative with regard to Russia.
Then came the Nabucco project. At the beginning, it was United States supporting these projects; the EU was a spectator, it was reluctant vis-a-vis Nabucco, which started with the objective to provide an alternative to Russian gas.
Then came Russia’s counter moves. Russia’s aim was to bypass Ukraine, as well as to block Nabucco; these two objectives gave life to South Stream. Even at the beginning, South Stream did not seem realistic financially, yet Russia insisted on it for political reasons.
After a while, the EU came to the picture; when the EU was coming in, United States was going out.
Was it because of the advent of shale gas?
It started even before that. Democrats supported these projects and when Republicans came to power they were less supportive, as they considered it the Democrats’ projects. With decreasing U.S. support, the EU’s ambivalent policies and lack of sufficient supply to be provided to Nabuccu, the project faded away. As a result, South Stream came to the forefront and it seemed more probable. Southern European countries had no alternative and had no choice but to accept it. In the meantime; what I call the ‘half-Nabucco,’ TANAP [Trans-Anatolian pipeline project that would carry Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey] came into being.
TANAP will provide 10 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe and 6 billion to Turkey; but it has the potential for receiving gas from Iran, Iraq and even Turkmenistan. It can be expanded and provide alternative gas to Europe. The EU was not so willing to acceptRussian gas on Russian conditions, so it came out with the idea of conditionality, the unbundling; you cannot own the pipelines, you have to leave the pipeline business to private companies, etc.
If Europe had wanted Russian gas, it could have easily provided an exception and some of the European energy companies, like ENİ and others, insisted that this project is being given an exception. But the EU acted on political, rather than economic, grounds.Russian President Vladimir Putin had no alternative but to give up the project.
Was the EU’s stance hardened due to Russia’s regional assertive policies, like in Ukraine?
Even before the Ukraine crisis, I believe the EU was motivated by avoiding being too dependent on Russian energy. At the present situation; Russia has decided to provide gas to Europe through Turkey; it will bring it to Thrace. The pipelines will not be under its control; so it would have been the same situation with South Stream, had it accepted European conditions.
But what will Turkey gain from it?
We don’t know whether EU countries will agree to buy Russian gas, and if so, under what conditions?
Would any investment be possible without taking into consideration how this gas will be sold and how much of it under what conditions? I believe such investment would not be realistic. There are many that questions need to be answered.
In addition, there is the economic situation. Will Russia be able to invest such a deal of money at a time when financing from Western markets is not possible and when theRussian economy is under sanctions?
I have my doubts about the realization of this so called ‘Turkish Stream.’ In the short term, it might be useful for Turkey. Nobody is sure what will happen in Ukraine. Turkey’s supply line from Ukraine could be interrupted. Although we have Blue Stream, an additional attentive might be useful in the short term.
But in the long term, the project being actualized could take some time. In addition to that; the 60 billion cubic meters of Russian gas coming to Europe through Turkey will jeopardize the expansion of TANAP.
I think TANAP will be realized, but what is at risk is the expansion of TANAP; 60 billion plus 16 million; it would be too much. Europe will again be dependent of Russian gas.
Looking from this point, we need to ask what Turkey’s importance for Europe is as far as energy is concerned. It is to provide an alternative gas supply to Europe so that it can be independent from Russia. That advantage from Turkish Stream might be at risk.
It was a political decision perhaps on the part of Turkish government; not seeing a future on its relations with the EU; it might have sought to strengthen its relations with Russia.
Do you think Turkey no longer values being an alternative energy supply to the EU?
That would be too strong; Turkey is trying to balance these two interests. Perhaps it also wants to give some messages to the EU.
But could Turkey say ‘no’ to Russia, when Putin came with this proposal. Can it risk antagonizing Moscow?
We are already too dependent on Russia, why should we be more dependent on Russia? In addition, Russia and Turkey have always been on good terms, they need to be on good terms. They need each other. All Turkish and Russian governments in the past have been careful not to disrupt their relations in spite their differences on many political issues. They were able to compartmentalize their differences and move forward on issues on which they had mutual interests. I don’t think our refusal would have in any way hampered our relations
So Turkey could have said ‘no’ to Russia, without worrying about being antagonizing?
Look at Russian policies: They proposed a 5 percent reduction in the price of the natural gas they sell us, whereas the oil prices have decreased almost 50 percent and gas prices are usually calculated in accordance with oil prices. This 5 percent reduction is ridiculous; they should have given us this reduction even before oil prices dropped.
They are bargaining like they are at the Turkish bazaar; that’s not fair and I understand that the Turkish government does not agree and they are trying to increase the reduction. We need to insist on it.
As a former diplomat, you were part of an establishment for which foreign separate relations with Iraqi Kurds was a taboo; what do you think about the current situation on energy?
I worked with [former late President Turgut] Özal. I was Özal’s adviser for more than two years. I am a student of Özal in this respect. Özal always had the solution of the Kurdish problem in his mind; to forge strong economic links both with Iraq and northern Iraq. He always said it is through these relations that we can strengthen Turkey. I believe in those policies, so I think, here, the government should pursue the same line.
How do you think Turkey’s overall energy policies evolved in the course of, say, the last two decades?
We have taken very important steps by realizing the BTC and the BTE, as well as initiating TANAP.
We are too reliant on Russia. We should limit our reliance on Russia and we need to balance it more carefully. We should not discard Russia; it is an important player both in terms of energy and international politics. But we should play the game taking into account Turkish interests and its relations with both Europe and the West. I think that balance is being disrupted to some extent in favor of Russia.
Who is Mithat Balkan ?
Born in 1944, former Envoy Mithat Balkan graduated from the University of Ankara’s Faculty of Law in 1967 and entered the Foreign Ministry in 1968.
He served at the Turkish embassies to Tehran and Washington, at the Turkish delegation to the Council ofEurope and at the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the European Union.
He served as adviser for foreign affairs to former presidents Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel.
He also served as ambassador to Iran and to Austria, as permanent representative to the World Trade Organization and as the deputy undersecretary for economic affairs. He last served as coordinator and adviser for energy affairs at the Foreign Ministry before retiring in 2007.
He subsequently worked as a senior adviser at Çalık Enerji until 2011.
December/29/2014
Source: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-stream-risks-turkeys-advantage-as-an-alternative-to-russia.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76205&NewsCatID=348
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