Costanza Concetti, Georgetown University
The new found hydrocarbon resources in the Mediterranean may represent the pretext for long-awaited regional integration
With Eni’s discovery offshore Egypt of the Zohr Field, whose 850 bcm of lean gas make it the largest gas trove in the Mediterranean to date, the Eastern Mediterranean has officially become a viable supply basin for the needs of gas-hungry Europe. The collective 3,500 bcm of natural gas reserves found offshore Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, Gaza, and Egypt, and a predicted 10,000 bcm more lying in the ground, will predictably challenge the previous monopoly held by current suppliers like Russia, Algeria, and Nigeria. Contemporarily, as previous historical importers set out to become natural gas exporters, neighboring countries that harbored frosty relationships are already being brought together in the interest of effectively exporting and marketing the newfound resources. The Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves and their export may therefore transform the geopolitics of energy that currently connect Europe, Russia, Turkey, the Middle East, and the African continent in a complex web of interdependencies.
Positive trends
A common trend in the basin is that of thawing relations between Israel and the countries who could help the export of Israeli gas. Between 2009 and 2010 Israel discovered two major gas fields offshore its coasts, Leviathan estimated around 500 bcm, and Tamar at circa 280 bcm, thus boasting the second largest reserves in the region. Thanks to the discoveries of the Israeli fields and the most recent Egyptian Zohr, Egyptian-Israeli relations may be said to be at their highest level in history, as the two countries have found mutual beneficial economic opportunities in gas. Cairo and Jerusalem may be close to reaching a multi-billion dollar deal which would unblock the export of Israeli gas to Egypt. Cairo needs the gas until Zohr is fully developed and Israel could greatly benefit from the large export infrastructure boasted by Egypt, which is now remaining idle.
Similar dynamics have been created by the discovery in 2011 of Aphrodite, a 190 bcm field offshore Cyprus. Both Israel and Cyprus are looking to export their gas, however the kind of infrastructure development needed to do so calls for significant, long-term investment, the kind more easily done in cooperation than by a single actor. It is no surprise then that Israeli-Cypriot relations, before 2011 almost non-existent, have thrived in the five years since the discovery of Aphrodite, with the Cypriot President Christofias visiting his counterpart in 2011, and Netanyahu becoming the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit Cyprus in 2012. The Cypriot Navy is said to be planning to buy Israeli high-tech offshore patrol vessels to guard its exclusive economic zone, for Nicosia and Jerusalem both want to divide the Mediterranean seabed in areas of exclusive rights of extraction - ambition that they also share with Athens. Despite historical pro-Arab foreign policies used by Greece to protect Greek minorities in Egypt, ensure import of cheap Arab oil, and score the support of Arab countries in their dispute against Cyprus in the United Nations, Athens is indeed also finding common grounds with Jerusalem when it comes to Eastern Mediterranean gas.
After years of thawing relations between Israel and Greece as a result of the rise of Erdogan’s AKP party in Turkey, the two countries are now finding an opportunity for real cooperation in gas. Jerusalem and Athens find themselves on the same side of the dispute over the delimitation of the hydrocarbon-rich Eastern Mediterranean. They both favor the seabed division into exclusive economic zones of 200 nautical miles and both requested that the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea be applied to the exploration and exploitation of the Mediterranean.
Furthermore, Athens stands to greatly benefit from the successful development of Israel’s Tamar and Leviathan fields because its shipping industry could play an important role in transporting gas liquefied in Israel. Similarly, the construction of the East Mediterranean Pipeline, inserted by the European Commission in its list of projects of common interest, and envisioned to bring Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe via Crete, could bring large profits to the country.
The European Union indeed remains the most likely long-term end buyer of Eastern Mediterranean Gas even if the newfound resources have the potential to fuel multiple markets. Despite the recent reduction in its demand growth for this particular fossil fuel, the EU maintains a large pipeline network, which makes it effectively dependent on gas, a strong political will to diversify its energy risk basket away from Russia, and current large infrastructural projects offering possible input points for new gas injections. After all, the recent downward trend reflected more the combination of overly subsidized renewable intermittent capacity and low carbon prices than a real falling in regional energy demand.
Possible concerns
After years of thawing relations between Israel and Greece as a result of the rise of Erdogan’s AKP party in Turkey, the two countries are now finding an opportunity for real cooperation in gas. Jerusalem and Athens find themselves on the same side of the dispute over the delimitation of the hydrocarbon-rich Eastern Mediterranean. They both favor the seabed division into exclusive economic zones of 200 nautical miles and both requested that the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea be applied to the exploration and exploitation of the Mediterranean.
Furthermore, Athens stands to greatly benefit from the successful development of Israel’s Tamar and Leviathan fields because its shipping industry could play an important role in transporting gas liquefied in Israel. Similarly, the construction of the East Mediterranean Pipeline, inserted by the European Commission in its list of projects of common interest, and envisioned to bring Israeli and Cypriot gas to Europe via Crete, could bring large profits to the country.
The European Union indeed remains the most likely long-term end buyer of Eastern Mediterranean Gas even if the newfound resources have the potential to fuel multiple markets. Despite the recent reduction in its demand growth for this particular fossil fuel, the EU maintains a large pipeline network, which makes it effectively dependent on gas, a strong political will to diversify its energy risk basket away from Russia, and current large infrastructural projects offering possible input points for new gas injections. After all, the recent downward trend reflected more the combination of overly subsidized renewable intermittent capacity and low carbon prices than a real falling in regional energy demand.
Possible concerns
Although the discovery of Eastern Mediterranean gas has produced the positive trends just exposed, like all natural resources in contestable territory the offshore gas is also creating some regional tension. Israeli-Lebanese relations have for example been seriously strained by a dispute regarding approximately 330 square miles of seabed in an area that is potentially rich in hydrocarbon resources. When in December 2010 Jerusalem chose to sign a bilateral agreement with Nicosia to officially delimitate its waters, Beirut took it as a serious affront and accused both countries to violate Lebanon’s maritime rights.
This meant for Cypriot-Lebanese relations to worsen and for the 2007 delimitation agreement between the two countries to be voided by the new Lebanese government. Moreover in 2011, during the televised event for the fifth anniversary of the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah directly warned Israel against ''extending its hands'' to Lebanese waters. Such a statement, seen by Israel as a sign that Lebanon may use its arsenal of missiles and rockets to harm its gas infrastructure, was met with Jerusalem’s purchase of at least two patrol vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and remote-control gunboats armed with missiles able to reach Lebanese land.
The already shaky political relationship between Beirut and Jerusalem is therefore more precarious than ever but at least the military balance of power seems to have stabilized. Contemporarily, Cyprus’ warming relations with Israel and the economic and diplomatic strength that the island state is deriving from its newfound offshore resources are seriously alarming Ankara. As a matter of fact, a strong Cyprus is an unacceptable scenario for the neighboring country. This has manifested in actions like Ankara entering Cypriot waters in 2014 with the declared intention of collecting seismic data, which Nicosia considered a violation of its sovereign rights. This particular instance was particularly concerning if considering the fact that Cyprus had already licensed the area entered by Turkish vessels to foreign energy companies.
Turkish-Israeli relations have also been worsened by disputes over Mediterranean gas. The Turkish government is concerned about the warming in relations between Cyprus and Israel, something it had not predicted, especially because it fears that energy cooperation may lead to similar collaboration in terms of security management, trade and diplomacy. Ankara refuses to accept the delimitation of the Mediterranean in exclusive economic zones and has threatened Israel that it would intervene to stop it from exploiting land that it does not have a right to. Jerusalem takes the threats seriously and has positioned Israeli fighter jets in the Cypriot airbase of Paphos, which enjoys vicinity to Ankara. Despite all of this purported tension, a serious conflict between Ankara and Nicosia or Ankara and Jerusalem is ultimately unlikely. Turkey strongly benefits from its role as a regional transit state between gas-rich east and gas-hungry west and destabilizing the eastern Mediterranean would make investors in its precious energy infrastructure dangerously weary.
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The already shaky political relationship between Beirut and Jerusalem is therefore more precarious than ever but at least the military balance of power seems to have stabilized. Contemporarily, Cyprus’ warming relations with Israel and the economic and diplomatic strength that the island state is deriving from its newfound offshore resources are seriously alarming Ankara. As a matter of fact, a strong Cyprus is an unacceptable scenario for the neighboring country. This has manifested in actions like Ankara entering Cypriot waters in 2014 with the declared intention of collecting seismic data, which Nicosia considered a violation of its sovereign rights. This particular instance was particularly concerning if considering the fact that Cyprus had already licensed the area entered by Turkish vessels to foreign energy companies.
Turkish-Israeli relations have also been worsened by disputes over Mediterranean gas. The Turkish government is concerned about the warming in relations between Cyprus and Israel, something it had not predicted, especially because it fears that energy cooperation may lead to similar collaboration in terms of security management, trade and diplomacy. Ankara refuses to accept the delimitation of the Mediterranean in exclusive economic zones and has threatened Israel that it would intervene to stop it from exploiting land that it does not have a right to. Jerusalem takes the threats seriously and has positioned Israeli fighter jets in the Cypriot airbase of Paphos, which enjoys vicinity to Ankara. Despite all of this purported tension, a serious conflict between Ankara and Nicosia or Ankara and Jerusalem is ultimately unlikely. Turkey strongly benefits from its role as a regional transit state between gas-rich east and gas-hungry west and destabilizing the eastern Mediterranean would make investors in its precious energy infrastructure dangerously weary.
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