Griffin Judd
International border disputes are very common, and in the normal course of events rarely draw any attention. But what happens when one of the countries in the dispute refuses to acknowledge the other’s existence? This complicates things, because the two countries then cannot negotiate directly. After all, negotiation implies recognition.
That is the dilemma currently facing Israel and Lebanon, who, since 2011, have been arguing over an 856 sq km piece of ocean.
But why is this area of the sea worth fighting about? What are the problems? And more importantly, what are the possible solutions?
History of the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Dispute
To understand this dispute, one must understand the international laws behinds it. At the root of the problem lies is the jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under this treaty, states are entitled to a 200-nautical mile Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) off their coast. Within this zone, states have exclusive rights to exploit natural resources, such as fish and oil.
Lebanon ratified UNCLOS and submitted its proposed border to the UN in 2011; Israel never ratified the treaty, but generally adheres to it, and submitted its proposed border to the UN at the same time.
And here the dispute arose.
Lebanon does not recognize Israel as a country, and has no diplomatic relations with them. Instead, Lebanon refers to Israel as “the state of Palestine” when submitting treaties to the UN, and the two countries must rely on third parties when concluding negotiations. Israel and Lebanon’s land border (sometimes referred to as the Blue Line) is based on the 1949 armistice agreement and the British-French Paulet-Newcombe Agreement which demarcated the boundary between Mandatory Palestine and Mandatory Syria and Lebanon.
The UNCLOS and Paulet-Newcombe treaties are the foundation of all subsequent Israeli-Lebanese border negotiations.
Both Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2010 concluded maritime border agreements with Cyprus. Lebanon, during its negotiations with Cyprus, marked the southernmost point of its border as Point 1. However, Lebanon was forced to cancel the agreement under pressure from Turkey (meaning it never entered into force). This provided a precedent for Israel, which during its negotiations with Cyprus used Point 1 to indicate its northernmost border.
Lebanon, meanwhile, submitted to the UN borders which were different from those used in its Cyprus negotiations. Point 23, and not Point 1, would be considered the southernmost point of Lebanon’ s EEZ, a provocative difference of 17 km. It’s not clear why the Lebanese altered their demarcation, though some believe they wanted to antagonize Israel.
Whatever the reason, this resulted in the overlap between Israel and Lebanon’s claimed EEZs.
Why Does It Matter?
If the disputed zone was just empty ocean, the Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute would be a non-issue. However, Israel’s coastal waters contain reserves of oil and natural gas. It is speculated that the waters off Lebanon do as well, with reserves extending into the disputed zone.
The stakes are high.
Estimates based on seismic studies suggest Lebanon’s EEZ may contain up to 25 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, an enormous windfall worth billions of dollars for a state whose economy has lagged in recent decades. However, there is also an element of geopolitical danger, as Lebanon seeks to assert its sovereignty at the cost of Israel’s. Indeed, the dispute only rose in prominence in 2018, when Lebanon began selling drilling permits for “blocks” of their EEZ; A combined venture by Total, ENI, and Novatek purchased rights to explore Blocks 4 and 9, the latter of which contains part of the disputed zone.
The Israeli defense minister at the time, Avigdor Liberman, called the move “very provocative,” and the dispute quietly simmered for a year and a half until April, 2019, when Lebanese officials indicated a willingness to negotiate over the zone. Facilitated by the US, direct talks were expected to begin in July, 2019. However, that month an Israeli naval vessel entered the disputed waters, a possible provocation for the Lebanese government.
Lebanese officials hope to avoid geopolitical complications interfering with the exploitation of their resources, as happened to the Palestinian Authority. In 1999, the PA cooperated with Royal Dutch Shell to drill in the Gaza Marine gas field. However, Shell withdrew from the partnership in 2018 following almost two decades of political difficulties — much of it stemming from Hamas’ rule of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s blockade.
What’s Being Done?
In the absence of direct relations between the two countries, resolving the Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute is tricky. However, president Barack Obama sent several mediators to try resolving the dispute.
The first mediator, Frederic Hof presented a plan in May 2012 creating a provisional but legally binding maritime separation line and a buffer zone with no petroleum activities. According to media reports, it acknowledged that around 500 sq km of the disputed area belong to Lebanon. It didn’t satisfy Beirut but was neither approved nor officially rejected at the time.
A second US mediator, Amos J. Hochstein, proposed a plan more favorable to Lebanon. But the plan never took off due to Lebanese government instability and Israel’s lack of enthusiasm for it.
The Trump administration — notorious for its undermanned diplomatic staff — allowed the issue to simmer until Lebanon signaled it was ready to renew talks in April 2019. Since then, US envoy David Satterfield has been working to set the terms for the July conference, and it has been suggested that a possible solution to the Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute will open both countries’ waters for seismic surveying.
SOURCE
To understand this dispute, one must understand the international laws behinds it. At the root of the problem lies is the jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under this treaty, states are entitled to a 200-nautical mile Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) off their coast. Within this zone, states have exclusive rights to exploit natural resources, such as fish and oil.
Lebanon ratified UNCLOS and submitted its proposed border to the UN in 2011; Israel never ratified the treaty, but generally adheres to it, and submitted its proposed border to the UN at the same time.
And here the dispute arose.
Lebanon does not recognize Israel as a country, and has no diplomatic relations with them. Instead, Lebanon refers to Israel as “the state of Palestine” when submitting treaties to the UN, and the two countries must rely on third parties when concluding negotiations. Israel and Lebanon’s land border (sometimes referred to as the Blue Line) is based on the 1949 armistice agreement and the British-French Paulet-Newcombe Agreement which demarcated the boundary between Mandatory Palestine and Mandatory Syria and Lebanon.
The UNCLOS and Paulet-Newcombe treaties are the foundation of all subsequent Israeli-Lebanese border negotiations.
Both Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2010 concluded maritime border agreements with Cyprus. Lebanon, during its negotiations with Cyprus, marked the southernmost point of its border as Point 1. However, Lebanon was forced to cancel the agreement under pressure from Turkey (meaning it never entered into force). This provided a precedent for Israel, which during its negotiations with Cyprus used Point 1 to indicate its northernmost border.
Lebanon, meanwhile, submitted to the UN borders which were different from those used in its Cyprus negotiations. Point 23, and not Point 1, would be considered the southernmost point of Lebanon’ s EEZ, a provocative difference of 17 km. It’s not clear why the Lebanese altered their demarcation, though some believe they wanted to antagonize Israel.
Whatever the reason, this resulted in the overlap between Israel and Lebanon’s claimed EEZs.
Why Does It Matter?
If the disputed zone was just empty ocean, the Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute would be a non-issue. However, Israel’s coastal waters contain reserves of oil and natural gas. It is speculated that the waters off Lebanon do as well, with reserves extending into the disputed zone.
The stakes are high.
Estimates based on seismic studies suggest Lebanon’s EEZ may contain up to 25 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, an enormous windfall worth billions of dollars for a state whose economy has lagged in recent decades. However, there is also an element of geopolitical danger, as Lebanon seeks to assert its sovereignty at the cost of Israel’s. Indeed, the dispute only rose in prominence in 2018, when Lebanon began selling drilling permits for “blocks” of their EEZ; A combined venture by Total, ENI, and Novatek purchased rights to explore Blocks 4 and 9, the latter of which contains part of the disputed zone.
The Israeli defense minister at the time, Avigdor Liberman, called the move “very provocative,” and the dispute quietly simmered for a year and a half until April, 2019, when Lebanese officials indicated a willingness to negotiate over the zone. Facilitated by the US, direct talks were expected to begin in July, 2019. However, that month an Israeli naval vessel entered the disputed waters, a possible provocation for the Lebanese government.
Lebanese officials hope to avoid geopolitical complications interfering with the exploitation of their resources, as happened to the Palestinian Authority. In 1999, the PA cooperated with Royal Dutch Shell to drill in the Gaza Marine gas field. However, Shell withdrew from the partnership in 2018 following almost two decades of political difficulties — much of it stemming from Hamas’ rule of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s blockade.
What’s Being Done?
In the absence of direct relations between the two countries, resolving the Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute is tricky. However, president Barack Obama sent several mediators to try resolving the dispute.
The first mediator, Frederic Hof presented a plan in May 2012 creating a provisional but legally binding maritime separation line and a buffer zone with no petroleum activities. According to media reports, it acknowledged that around 500 sq km of the disputed area belong to Lebanon. It didn’t satisfy Beirut but was neither approved nor officially rejected at the time.
A second US mediator, Amos J. Hochstein, proposed a plan more favorable to Lebanon. But the plan never took off due to Lebanese government instability and Israel’s lack of enthusiasm for it.
The Trump administration — notorious for its undermanned diplomatic staff — allowed the issue to simmer until Lebanon signaled it was ready to renew talks in April 2019. Since then, US envoy David Satterfield has been working to set the terms for the July conference, and it has been suggested that a possible solution to the Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute will open both countries’ waters for seismic surveying.
SOURCE
